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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



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MEMORANDUM

TO: NSC - Richard Clarke
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Richard Brennan
OSD/ISA/AFR - James Woods
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JCS/J-5 - ADM Frank Bowman
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PM/DRSA - Joe Bowab
CIA [redacted]
USUN - Rick Inderturth
David Shefford
P - Bruce Thomas
Esther Brimmer

FROM: AF - Prudence Bushnell *PB*
SUBJECT: Peacekeeping in Rwanda

We invite you to attend a meeting on Friday, August 6 at 2 pm at the State Department, room 3519, to determine whether the USG should support a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. You have already received an analysis of all the various options in a paper dated July 26 (circulated to all addressee offices and attached for your convenience). It seems increasingly apparent that the least expensive option that will meet our peacekeeping objectives is the one recommended by Ambassador Flaten (option five). Based on the latest developments in the field, we

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believe that this limited approach will provide the necessary level of security at a much lower cost (approximately \$8 million for one year) than the much larger PKO forces (costing approximately \$37.5 million) contemplated in the other principal options.

With today's signing of a peace agreement in Arusha, time is of the essence. The two sides are counting on deployment of a neutral international force to help establish a climate of security and confidence during which they can launch a transition government and start the military integration and demobilization process. A good beginning may make the difference between success and failure. Without it, the risk of renewed war and continuing emergency aid requirements (predicted to cost the USG at least \$35 million this fiscal year) will be greatly increased.

Attachment:

As stated.

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